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THE ERA OF NETWORK TERRORISM.
THE EVOLUTION OF THE ORGANISATIONAL
STRUCTURE OF THE GLOBAL SALAFI JIHAD
MOVEMENT AT THE BEGINNING OF THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
The third wave of modern jihadism, with which we have to do now, is related to the
activities of the global Salafi jihad movement. Most scholars of modern Islamic terror-
ism take the view that the above-mentioned phenomenon is a social movement involv-
ing a collection of terrorist organisations with different levels of centralised leadership
structure, implementing different forms of interaction, cooperating with each other in
relation to a number of common objectives and coordinating activities through a net-
work of direct and indirect ties. The network structure of the movement, especially the
nature of the nodes and connections between them, determines the scale of the threat of
Islamic terrorism in the early twenty-first century. The identification of key nodes and
characterisation of basic network links should contribute to a better understanding of
the phenomenon of Islamic terrorism, identification of key evolutionary trends, and de-
velopment of recommendations for reducing the threat of terrorism.
In the social sciences, the problem of the network nature of social movements has been
subjected to thorough analysis since the nineteen-seventies. Systematic studies found in the
works of Curtis, Zurcher, Zald, Caroll, Ratner, McCarthy, and many other researchers
helped to find answers relating to, for example, the impact of the network position of indi-
viduals and organisations on their actions and behaviour in a social movement.1
Among the key concepts used in analyses of network structures are: nodes, links be-
tween nodes, the essence of relationships, and network boundaries. Network nodes
consist essentially of individual or collective actors (social groups). Links between
nodes can be viewed on many levels. Direct and indirect links, or interpersonal and
inter-organisational ones are those most often analysed. Direct links involve unmedi-
ated interaction between actors. They may arise from kinship, connections, information
sharing, or joint participation in the activities of a social movement. Actors can share
common norms by participating in a conflict on the same side. In terms of an organisa-
tion, it is a case of joint alliances, information sharing, provision of human resources, or
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practical support (financial and organisational). In the matter of indirect links, the exis-
tence of interpersonal relationships cannot be accurately determined. However, mere
participation in specific events, or sharing key forms of activity, may lead to a convic-
tion of the existence of this type of relationship.
The question of the network nature of terrorist structures seems to have been, so far,
addressed only occasionally. In the last few years, however, there have been a number
of monographs and scientific articles dealing with many of the key aspects of this prob-
lem. These analyses have a foundation in game theory and mathematical tools. Among
the authors involved in this issue are Marc Sageman, John Arquilla or David Ronfeldt.2
THE ESSENCE OF TERRORIST NETWORKS
Over the last few decades, the organisational structure of terrorist groups has under-
gone significant evolution. Back in the mid-eighties and early nineties, the vast major-
ity of these groups had a hierarchical key structure. This method of organisation is also
replicated today, but concerns only local structures. It is the increase in the range of ter-
rorist activity that is one of the important factors affecting the organisation of these
groups. This statement does not mean, however, that there are only hierarchical struc-
tures at the local level. It could be said that both hierarchical and network structures co-
exist. A choice of either of them or their peculiar convergence depend on such external
and internal factors as group size, the range of its activities, the choice of strategy and
tactics, and the impact of the external environment (national, international) on its activ-
ities.
Mitch Strippling, in one of his articles about the organisation of terrorist network
structures defined two levels of their analysis: local and global.3 Hence, he mentioned
the existence of network structures that are direct and scale-free. With respect to the
first level, citing the findings of Arquilla and Ronfeldt, he referred to three types of net-
works: linear, centrifugal, and multichannel (Fig. 1).4 In view of the above-mentioned
levels of analysis, they can be called first-level types.
The first type most often applies to those groups that, in addition to terrorist activi-
ties, are involved in criminal activities (e.g., smuggling). Centrifugal networks develop
wherever there is a need to coordinate terrorist activities through a central node (e.g.,
a local group leader). A multichannel network is the next stage of the structural evolu-
tion of terrorist networks and is characterised by the fact that each node generates rela-
tionships with others.
Given the empirical findings of science related to the discovery of the laws govern-
ing the proliferation of real networks in the physical world,5 and hence the law of
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2 See: M. Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, University of Pennsylvania Press, Phila-
delphia 2004; Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy, (eds.) J. Arquilla,
D. Ronfeldt, RAND’s National Defense Research Institute Report, 2001.
3 M. Strippling, Embodying Terror Networks: How Direction Creates Structure, http://www.cri-
sisville.com/files/Terrorism-DirectedNetworks.pdf, November 2012, p. 3.
4 J. Arquilla, D. Ronfeldt, The Advent of Netwar (Revisited), op. cit., pp. 6–8.
5 See in this matter: A.-L. Barabasi, Linked, Penguin Books, New York 2003.
growth and preferred connections, M. Strippling pointed to the existence of the follow-
ing two types of networks: chaotic and orderly.6 These are the so-called second-level
networks. They are characterised by the development of more complex relationships
between nodes in structures of potentially unlimited size. In orderly structures, much
importance is given to the so-called primary nodes, by reference to which the most nu-
merous and most important links are produced.
According to the theory by Barbasi, a special feature of today’s terrorist networks is
their natural growth and adaptation. In other words, the structures can grow in any geo-
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LINEAR NETWORK CENTRIFUGAL NETWORK MULTICHANEL NETWORK
Figure 1. Main types of first-level network
Source: J. Arquilla, D. Ronfeldt, The Advent of Netwar (Revisited), in: Networks and Netwars: The Future of Ter-
ror, Crime and Militancy, (eds.) J. Arquilla, D. Ronfeldt, RAND’s National Defense Research Institute Report,
2001, p. 8.
CHAOTIC NETWORK ORDERLY NETWORK
Figure 2. Main types of second-level network
Source: Author’s own concept based on M. Strippling, Embodying Terror Networks: How Direction Creates
Structure, op. cit., p. 6.
6 M. Strippling, Embodying Terror Networks: How Direction Creates Structure, op. cit., p. 6.
graphical direction, in any social and cultural environment depending on the needs, and
produce the most efficient connections between the nodes (and thus de facto multichan-
nel and centrifugal subnetworks). In this approach, second-level networks consist of
several first-level subnetworks.
NATURE AND ORIGINS OF THE GLOBAL SALAFI JIHAD MOVEMENT
The name global jihad Salafi movement used in this article needs to be clarified. In
the narrower sense, this term is to be understood as all the elements that were focused
around the “founding fathers,” Abdullah Azzam, Osama bin Laden, or Ayman
al-Zawahiri, that strengthened contacts and joined up with the group created by them
under the name al-Qaeda. In its broad meaning, the jihadist movement, in addition to
the above-mentioned elements, also includes independent organisations working to at-
tain similar targets to al-Qaeda’s, but on their own account and using autonomous or-
ganisational and operational bases.7
An outline of the various components of the global Salafi jihad movement is shown
in Figure 3.
Assaf Moghadam identified four essential functions of the ideology of Salafi jihad.
The first is an explanatory function. The main role of this ideology’s proponents is ac-
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Figure 3. Outline of the relationships between the various components
of the global Salafi jihad movement
Source: Author’s own concept.
7 In this work, the term global jihad Salafi movement (GJSM) is used in the narrower sense.
tion to raise awareness in the Muslim community related to the fact that Islam is in dan-
ger. They compare the challenges of the current period with the initial period of growth
in its popularity, claiming that Islam is now being removed from religious, political and
social life.8 The second is a diagnostic function. Proponents of the ideology identify
specific causes of the current problems in the Muslim world. They argue that “Cru-
saders”, “Zionists”, and Muslim regimes accused of apostasy are responsible for the
humiliation and oppression of Muslims.9 In the case of the third function, associated
with the process of the formation of group identity, proponents of the ideology point
out that for all Muslims lost in the modern world it is a source of self-determination and
ensures adherence to a supranational structure which is the ummah. Finally, the fourth
indicates specific targets and modes of action, especially of jihad (“holy war”), under-
stood in military terms, associated with martyrdom (understood as the sacrifice of life
for the cause of Islam).10 One of the characteristics of supporters of the ideology of
Salafi jihad is also a dichotomous view of social reality. They divide the world into
those who follow doctrinal guidelines and those who are accused of apostasy. The pro-
moters of the reinterpretation of the above-mentioned ideology, promoting a vision of
global Salafi jihad (thus extending its reach to the whole modern world), ignore on the
one hand the recommendations made by moderate Salafi schools, prohibiting the kill-
ing of civilians, and on the other hand positive examples of the support of Western
countries for Muslim states. In the case of the postulated modes of action, one of the
most important is violence. Its legitimacy is associated with an indication of its ultimate
objective, utopian in substance. This already came to the notice of Stephen Holmes,
who suggested that the caliphate postulated by the ideologists of global jihad was “the
religious equivalent of the Marxist utopia”.11
A special feature of the global Salafi jihad movement, as Rohan Gunaratna rightly
pointed out, is its concealed and difficult to penetrate structure and diversity of iden-
tity.12 The genesis of the root node of the global jihadist network, which adopted the
name al-Qaeda, is closely related to two important events of 1979: the Islamic Revolu-
tion in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. One of the consequences of the Is-
lamic Revolution and the subsequent policies of the new Iranian government was the
creation of a number of Islamic groups in the Middle East, Africa, Asia, the Caucasus,
the Balkans, and Western Europe.
Arab communities involved in the struggle against the aggressors in Afghanistan
were led by many well-known Islamic activists. One of them was the Palestinian
Abdullah Yusuf Azzam. He already in 1984, together with Osama bin Laden founded
an Afghan Services Bureau. The cooperation between the two lasted until the end of the
eighties. The bureau served as a channel of Islamic propaganda and a place for the re-
cruitment of new members (through a network of offices, for example, several in the
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p. 15.
9 Ibidem.
10 Ibidem.
11 S. Holmes, Al-Qaeda, September 11, 2001, in: Making Sense of Suicide Missions, (ed.)
D. Gambetta, Oxford–New York 2005, p. 170, as cited in ibidem.
12 R. Gunaratna, Inside al Qaeda. Global Network of Terror, New York 2003, p. 4.
United States and at least 35 in other countries). Thanks to the organisation, many Is-
lamic fighters were recruited, trained, and shifted to Afghanistan.
Abdullah Azzam was one of a few Islamic visionaries. When the struggle with the
Russians in Afghanistan was coming to an end, A. Azzam drew the mujahideen’s at-
tention to a new target, fearing that without it they could come to a bad end.13 As the
spiritual leader of the international Islamic movement, Azzam formulated in the
mid-eighties a number of training guidelines for al-Qaidah al-Sulbah (which can be
translated as “the solid base”), a “pious group and pioneering vanguard”.14 The organi-
sation’s founding document, published in the al-Jihad declared, “Tenacity and asser-
tive decision to continue the journey are essential, however long it would take...”.15 In
the above-mentioned paper it was also stated that every principle must have a vanguard
that will carry it forward. [The vanguard] will pay a steep price and suffer many losses
while paving the road for an [Islamic] society. There is no belief, either earthly or heav-
enly, that does not need such a vanguard, one that will give all it has for its belief to be
victorious. This vanguard is the solid base (‘al-Qa?idah al-Sulbah’) of the society we
are awaiting.16
At the end of the war in Afghanistan, a jihad backed by supporters of bin Laden and
Azzam, was accelerated by rapid internationalisation.17 This happened due to a lot of
young fighters who, having approved of Azzam’s ideology, wanted to implement it in
the form of rapid and profound socio-political changes made where they came from and
to where they return. They became members of religious movements, radical political
parties, a broad anti-government opposition calling for an end to oppression by corrupt,
pro-Western regimes. As the policy action did not bring any noticeable effects, the only,
in their opinion, way to influence the current situation proved to be turning to violence.18
The Afghan Services Bureau was an asylum for them, offering them a safe haven.
Even before the end of the anti-Soviet campaign in Afghanistan, the Afghan Ser-
vices Bureau structure began to evolve at both the political and military levels. Both
people and equipment began to be flipped between places in the world where local re-
gimes were clearly hostile to Islamic movements and the fate of Muslim communities
was at risk. This was the case in Kashmir, Chechnya, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Somalia,
Malaysia, Indonesia, Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Yemen, Algeria, and Egypt. The
mujahideen, using both the Afghan Services Bureau and a number of charities cooper-
ating with it, infiltrated local conflicts, which resulted in sending training staff and sub-
sequent participation in these conflicts.19
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18 R. Gunaratna, Inside al Qaeda. Global Network of Terror, op. cit., p. 6.
19 Ibidem, p. 7.
The fight for the highest goals of the global Salafi jihad was institutionalised thanks
to Osama bin Laden probably at the end of 1989, after the death of Abdullah Azzam. At
that time, at the al-Farouq training camp, next to the Afghan Khost, bin Laden asked
a few trusted mujahideen to join him and began a new phase of the struggle aimed at the
liberation of Muslims oppressed in other parts of the world. This camp had been used
previously to indoctrinate new recruits sent later for military training to prepare them to
fight with the Russians. Those who expressed their approval for the proposal of bin
Laden were asked to take and sign an official oath before the leaders of the new move-
ment. That oath was taken by Abu Ayoub al-Iraqi, the then emir20 of the group, Abu
Ubaidah al-Banshiri, and Mohammed Atef. Al-Banshiri two years later took over the
function of al-Iraqi. In 1996, after the death of al-Banshiri, he was replaced by Atef. 21
The meeting was also attended by bin Laden’s other trustees, such as Ayman
al-Zawahiri (aka Abdel Moez), Fadhl al-Masry, Jamal Ahmed al-Fadl (aka Abu Bakr
Sudan), Abu Faraj al-Yemeni, and Abu Musab al-Saudi.22 Bin Laden significantly, but
indirectly affected the group over the years. He controlled and inspired in this way both
the vital organs and ordinary members of the movement. He had similar effects, but on
a completely different scale on external entities (other groups, Islamic communities),
which in the future would bear fruit.
Al-Qaeda was based first in Afghanistan, and then transferred to Pakistan (Pesh-
awar) and Sudan (Khartoum). The most important shelter for members of al-Qaeda,
however, was Afghanistan. Sheikh Abu Hamza al-Masri acknowledged the country
as “the capital of jihad”, the main area of the struggle waged by Muslims in the world
today.23
The arduous construction of the network structure of al-Qaeda began in the early
nineteen-nineties in Europe (mainly western and southern), Asia (especially southeast
Asia, but also in the Middle East), Africa, and the Americas. During the nineties – in
fact, until 1998 – the relations between al-Qaeda fighters and many terrorist and guer-
rilla organisations developed and evolved. Where there previously were no radical Is-
lamic movements, autonomous cells developed, operating on behalf of al-Qaeda. This
was the case in western and southern Europe. A different strategy was adopted in rela-
tion to those regions or countries where such movements took root. If they failed to be
penetrated from the inside, then an informal cooperation was created with them using
their operational capabilities when it turned out to be necessary. Osama bin Laden’s
al-Qaeda was created with people prepared for armed struggle and taking the same
views as the founders of the movement. This from the very beginning of its activity fa-
cilitated a highly efficient operation – in relation to variables such as the mobility of
members, the breadth of their activity, and the scope of their action. Members of affili-
ated organisations were not so mobile, their scope of activity was more local, and the
range of operational techniques used limited. It can therefore be seen that there was al-
ready pressure for the development of their own autonomous structures and sharing the
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22 Ibidem.
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responsibility for strategic action taken by these structures. Al-Qaeda could count in the
first half of the nineteen-nineties on the support of about 6–7 million radical Muslims
around the world. The number of potential candidates and members of the movement
was back then in the region of 120,000.24
The foundations of the movement’s global network, according to Rohan Gunaratna,
were built between 1991 and 1996.25 The structure was based on the functioning of sev-
eral key nodes that connected local networks, less and more complicated in terms of
structure, in different regions of the world. In this period, the structures in Sudan, Tur-
key, and Spain should be recognised as key. Their members were responsible for,
firstly, building networks in Western countries and, secondly, preparing and carrying
out terrorist operations mainly in Europe and the United States. R. Gunaratna believed
that this structure was highly decentralised, informal, and members of each key (in the
operational sense) nodes did not have specific assignments (whether regional or func-
tional). This meant that if antiterrorist services uncovered such structures in specific
countries (as was the case with Germany in 1998), other cells replaced their activity.
When it came to recruiting new members, friendship or family ties were very important
from the very beginning. This allowed individual cells to ensure high efficiency.
R. Gunaratna, however, analysed only the structure of second-level network, moving
away from reflection on the meaning, essence, and evolution of the central nodes of the
analysed network. Such an approach seems to be unjustified in the light of current
knowledge about the functioning of the global jihadist network.
R. Gunaratna noticed, though, a pattern that is closely related to the above-men-
tioned theory of Barbasi. He stated that individual ethnic groups included in the jihadist
movement specialised in a particular type of function. For example, Libyans were re-
sponsible for providing fake documents, Algerians for false credit cards, Egyptians for
the operation of training camps around the world.26 However, operating cells did not
have an ethnically homogeneous character. In Europe, a large part of them was more
ethnically homogeneous, but not in the United States. Since the beginning of the
twenty-first century, however, these differences have seen a gradual blurring. A special
feature of the process of the evolution of the movement in the movement towards
a multiethnic nature of the operating cells of the jihadist movement.27 The conspirato-
rial model of their operation was based on proven principles tested in Europe (for exam-
ple, by the Red Army Fraction) and beyond (e.g., in Egypt by the Islamic Group28 and
the Egyptian Islamic Jihad). One of the key principles is to avoid direct contact between
cell members and between those members and the central nodes of the movement.
These contacts are often mediated (for this purpose agents are used). Members of
al-Qaeda and, more broadly, the jihadist movement in general are proficient in Arabic.
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All official documents and the vast majority of propaganda materials are created in it.
Non-Arab people who speak Arabic can join in the work of the movement. It is the
knowledge of Arabic that predestined participants of the movement to fill key node po-
sitions.29 The scope of the activity of the jihadist movement is global and is in no way
limited geographically.
STAGES IN THE EVOLUTION OF THE ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE
OF THE JIHADIST MOVEMENT
Over the past few years, the structure of the jihadist movement has changed signifi-
cantly. Bearing in mind the aforementioned stages of its evolution, the focus should be
placed on two main periods: before and after 1998. The date is provisional, associated
with the evolution of both the organisation (including the creation of the World Islamic
Front) and the operation of the jihadist movement (spectacular terrorist attacks on U.S.
embassies in Africa). It was in the second half of the nineties of the twentieth century
that the horizontal network structures of the jihadist movement began to take shape.
The starting point is, however, al-Qaeda, established in the late eighties. Its original
organisational structure set up in the founding documents of the period is a hierarchical
network. This is illustrated in Figure 4.
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Figure 4. Original model of the structure of the main bodies of al-Qaeda
Source: Author’s own concept based on Interior Organization, AFGP-2002-000080, CTC’s Harmony Document,
http://ctc.usma.edu/aq/pdf/AFGP-2002-000080-Trans.pdf, October 2012.
29 R. Gunaratna, Inside al Qaeda. Global Network of Terror, op. cit., p. 131.
A significant position in the organisational structure can be attributed to the Advi-
sory Council. It was the main, group decision-making body that oversaw the activities
of the other bodies. A fundamental role in this structure also played a body coordinating
the operating activities of the group, called the Military Committee.
The Military Committee was responsible for recruiting, training and transporting
fighters; for the preparation of parts of operations (especially the largest); the formula-
tion of tactical initiatives; and possibly the supply of the necessary weapons. The com-
mittee also oversees the so-called agents responsible for the management of individual
cells (it would be more appropriate to call them local networks), scattered around the
world. The cells were organised on the model of centrifugal or multichannel networks,
and thus first-level networks.
Cells, the basic parts of the organisational structure of al-Qaeda, were assigned three
different functions. In particular, managing cells were created, responsible for coordi-
nating the activity of a network of cells on a given territory. Their additional tasks in-
cluded propaganda and raising funds for operating activities. Such cells most often had
a centrifugal network structure. A significant role can be assigned to the heads of these
cells, and thus the agents of al-Qaida, planning and preparing the specific operational
activities of the group. The second type of cells was operating cells. They are typically
formed by 2–8 people, professionally prepared earlier in camps supervised by the
Military Committee for terrorist activities. These cells were organised on the model
of multichannel networks. The bigger the number of operational cells operating on
a particular territory, the bigger the need to coordinate their actions. This need gradually
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Figure 5. Model of the relationship between the Military Committee and the structures
it supervised (the first level network)
LEGEND: A – agents managing cells, B – fighters operating within individual cells.
Source: Author’s own concept.
led to the creation of more complex network structures. Managing cells were beginning
to become key nodes in the second-level networks. The above network structurwas
supported by backup cells. Their members were responsible, among other things, for
the recruitment of new members of operational cells.
In the late nineties, the global Salafi jihad movement set out on a path of rapid or-
ganisational change. What contributed to it was, on the one hand, the need to adapt this
structure to the changing strategy of operations and organisational absorption of new
jihadist groups sympathetic to al-Qaeda’s activity, and on the other hand an objective
necessity imposed by the large-scale and more effective antiterrorist activities of the
United States and its allies. After the formation of the World Islamic Front, at the turn of
the twentieth and twenty-first century, the growth in global jihadist movement struc-
tures began. In fact, the so-called second-level network structures were beginning to be
established. Their schematic shape is shown in Figure 6.
The central node is today essentially “classical” al-Qaeda, which adopted the name
Central Command of al-Qaeda. It was part of a structure under the name of the World Is-
lamic Front. Others were: the Egyptian Islamic Group, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the
Assembly of Pakistani Clergy, and the Movement of Islamic Holy War in Bangladesh.
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Figure 6. Model of the organisational network structure of the global jihad movement
(the second level network)
Source: Author’s own concept based on M. Sageman, Sieci terroru, Kraków 2008, p. 171.
This is indeed one of the most important nodes of the global jihadist movement. The
picture of the network structure of the movement is complemented by the so-called af-
filiated organisations, which in the structure of the movement currently number more
than 30, the so-called local networks and autonomous operating cells present in dozens
of countries. Affiliated organisations are independent terrorist groups, local or regional
in scope, working independently of each other, but in relation to common goals, using
similar measures, working toward the same strategic and tactical objectives. The most
famous include the al-Shabaab, al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, and Abu Sayyaf groups. They
have a hierarchical network key structure (first-level networks), which was the case for
al-Qaeda in the early period of its existence. A breakdown of these structures (that is,
the elimination of the key regional nodes) would facilitate the elimination or temporary
limitation of the scope of the activity of the global jihadist movement. However, it
would not eliminate the risk entirely, because of the fact that there are other organisa-
tional structures that under favourable circumstances could take over (unless they al-
ready are doing it now) the responsibility for the operation of a given area. Such
examples are many. On one hand, you can point to the area of the Maghreb, where
both Salafia Jihadia and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) were active. The lat-
ter group is an example of a local network of the jihadist movement. Currently, there are
at least three such networks: in addition to AQIM, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,
and the Islamic State of Iraq. The last element of the jihadist network is local cells
linked through agents to the central node of the jihadist movement. It is difficult to give,
even approximately, the number of currently existing cells. This number in fact under-
goes a dynamic changes (increases or decreases) depending on factors such as the ef-
fectiveness of propaganda and recruitment, the activity of agents of the jihadist
movement, the quality and number of recruits, or the counterterrorism activities of
modern states. They exist (although the vast majority are not active) in a number of de-
veloped states.
* * *
In the nineteen-nineties, the increasing operational efficiency of al-Qaeda derived
from the existence of first-level structures. With the formation of the World Islamic
Front and the establishment of a number of local nodes, they blended in a complex net-
work of relations based largely on authorities, and not just institutions. After the elimi-
nation, in the years 2001–2006, of a number of terrorist cells (both in Europe and North
America), more emphasis in the jihadist movement was placed on the activities of affil-
iated organisations, much less infiltrated than the basic structures of the movement.
They increasingly developed their operational capabilities by creating new networks
and in particular recruiting Muslims who were citizens of the countries in which such
activity was undertaken. After 2005, a number of new Islamic terrorist organisations
were created, referring to the Salafi ideology of global jihad, that expressed a desire to
affiliate with the “core” (the central node) of the movement.
The global Salafi jihad movement is now one of the most important examples of ter-
rorist groups of the era of modern network terrorism. The main conclusion from the
analysis of the evolution process of the organisational structure of the jihadist move-
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ment is the statement that we are currently dealing with a very advanced network struc-
ture, and more precisely, with a second-level structured network.
The network structure of the jihadist movement has developed naturally as a result
of reasonable changes in the organisational structure of the movement that began in the
nineteen-nineties. It was a response to objective and subjective processes in the interna-
tional environment and within individual states (globalisation, democratisation, cen-
tralisation of power, international community’s anti-terrorist activities). It was also
a result of absorption as part of the jihadist movement of the most effective organisa-
tional solutions facilitating its rapid, global growth. This growth is very dynamic,
which poses a serious threat to international security.
The organisational network structure of the global Salafi jihad movement thwarts its
penetration by external entities. The existing local nodes and the central node in spite of
the existing links (more mediated than direct), operate autonomously. Their elimination
will not have any decisive influence on the functioning of the whole movement. A sig-
nificant advantage that this movement utilises is the ability to replicate the nodes and
the relationship between them and other elements of the structure discussed above. In
this perspective, the elimination of the whole movement would be possible only if all
the key nodes were wiped out simultaneously.
ABSTRACT
This article is an attempt to draw attention to the issue of the network nature of terrorist struc-
tures in the early twenty-first century. It analyses the essence of the so-called network terrorism
from an Islamic perspective. The example of the global Salafi jihad movement (GSJM) is recog-
nised as key. It is a social movement established at the turn of the century, referring to the Salafi
ideology and promoting the so-called holy war with its enemies in the West. One of the principal
manifestations of its activity is terrorism. The evolution of the movement has occurred on sev-
eral levels, one of the more important of these being organisational. The proliferation of the ter-
rorist threat posed by the GSJM is closely associated with the construction of the network
structure of the organisation. Analysis of the available sources indicates that the current organi-
sation of the GSJM has the form of the so-called second-level structured network.
ERA TERRORYZMU SIECIOWEGO. EWOLUCJA STRUKTURY
ORGANIZACYJNEJ SALAFICKIEGO RUCHU GLOBALNEGO D¯IHADU
NA POCZ¥TKU XXI WIEKU
STRESZCZENIE
Artyku³ jest prób¹ zwrócenia uwagi na problematykê sieciowoœci struktur terrorystycznych
na pocz¹tku XXI wieku. Zajêto siê w nim analiz¹ istoty tzw. terroryzmu sieciowego z perspekty-
wy islamistycznej. Za kluczowy uznano przyk³ad salafickiego ruchu globalnego d¿ihadu
(SRGD). Jest to ruch spo³eczny, który powsta³ na prze³omie XX i XXI wieku, odwo³uj¹cy siê do
ideologii salafickiej i propaguj¹cy tzw. œwiêt¹ wojnê z wrogami Zachodu. Jednym z g³ównych
przejawów jego aktywnoœci jest aktywnoœæ terrorystyczna. Ewolucja ruchu przebiega³a na kilku
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p³aszczyznach, z których jedn¹ z wa¿niejszych jest p³aszczyzna organizacyjna. Proliferacja
zagro¿enia terrorystycznego ze strony SRGD œciœle wi¹¿e siê z budow¹ sieciowej struktury or-
ganizacyjnej. Analiza dostêpnych materia³ów Ÿród³owych wskazuje, i¿ aktualny kszta³t organi-
zacyjny SRGD przybra³ postaæ tzw. uporz¹dkowanej sieci drugiego poziomu.
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